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Brian C. Brush" 
I. Introduction 
Many forensic economists assert that a "risk-free" discount rate should be 
used to discount future lost earnings to present value in personal injury cases. 
By this they usually mean that the discount rate should be based on the yields 
that are available on securities with no risk of default. Sometimes they also 
mean that the securities should be as free as possible of inflation risk, the risk 
that unanticipated inflation will diminish the purchasing power of the lump 
sum award. The case for using a risk-free discount rate appears to rest pri-
marily on the case law rather than on any underlying economic or financial 
theory. And there has been a flow of recent articles arguing on economic 
grounds that a "risk-adjusted" discount rate should be used instead. 
The purposes of this paper are twofold. First, the paper surveys the legal 
and economic issues relating to the consideration of risk in discounting future 
lost earnings to present value. Second, it develops and presents empirical evi-
dence on the effect on present values of incorporating several alternative levels 
of risk into the discount rate. Data on investment returns on securities of 
varying degrees of risk are combined with data on the growth of labor compen-
sation to calculate a number of alternative net discount rates for historical pe-
riods of various lengths, and these net discount rates are used to compute pre-
sent values for future periods of various lengths. This makes it possible to ex-
amine the impact of potential risk adjustments on present value under varying 
circumstances. 
The rest of this paper is laid out as follows. Sections II and III briefly re-
view the legal and economic arguments, respectively, surrounding use· of a 
risk-free discount rate. Section N discusses the methods and data used to gen-
erate the empirical results, which are then briefly described in Sections V and 
VI. Finally, Section VII offers some concluding comments. 
II. Legal Background 
• A number of court decisions can be cited in support of the use of a risk-free 
discount rate. Gilbert has argued forcefully for what he calls the "risk free cri-
terion," quoting the U.S. Court of Appeals in Brown & Root, Inc. u. Desautel 
(1977): " ... the discount rate should be based on the yield paid by investments 
in the safest securities, without expecting the beneficiary to exercise financial 
expertise or skill." (Gilbert, 1991, p. 42) Gilbert stated that this requires a dis-
'Professor of Economics, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI. 
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count rate free of default risk, but he went on to say: "Ceteris paribus, the risk 
free criterion also appears to require that the risk due to unanticipated infla-
tion be minimized .... " (Gilbert, 1991, p. 42) It is generally the case that all U.S. 
Treasury securities are considered to be free of default risk, but until recently, 
only very short-term Treasury securities (Treasury bills) were also considered 
to minimize inflation risk. Since 1997, Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities 
(TIPS) have provided an alternative to Treasury bills as a means of minimizing 
inflation risk. 
Probably the most frequently cited opinion relating to use of the risk-free 
discount rate comes from the U.S. Supreme Court in Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp. v. Pfeifer (1983), which in turn drew liberally upon its earlier decision in 
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Kelly (1916). According to the Pfeifer court: 
The discount rate should be based on the rate of interest that 
would be earned on 'the best and safest investments.' Once it is as-
sumed that the injured worker would definitely have worked for a 
specific term of years, he is entitled to a risk-free stream of future . 
income to replace his lost wages; therefore, the discount rate should 
not reflect the market's premium for investors who are willing to ac-
cept some risk of default. (Jones and Laughlin, 1983, p. 537) 
Yandell (1991) has interpreted Pfeifer to mean that the discount rate 
should be both default risk free and inflation risk free. Others have apparently 
come to the same conclusion (see Romans and Floss, 1992; Albrecht and Wood, 
1997). Ireland also has cited Pfeifer as the primary support for his view that 
the discount rate should not carry a premium for default risk (Ireland, 1999, p. 
157). He has noted elsewhere, however, that while Pfeifer mandates a U~~""V'LU"~':. 
rate free of default risk, it does not mandate a discount rate free of what 
calls "inflation uncertainty."l (Ireland, 1997, p. 28) Thus, all intermediate Ol' 
long term Treasury securities, not just short-term Treasuries or TIPS, 
presumably satisfy the legal mandate of Pfeifer. 
The Pfeifer opinion arose out of a federal court proceeding dealing with fed-·: 
eral statutory law (the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation, 
Act), and it "sets a standard that is applied in many legal venues, both state 
and federaf' (Ireland, 1999, p. 157). This probably explains why, according to a 
recent survey, only U.S. government securities were used for discounting by·· 
82% of the members of the National Association of Forensic Economics (Brook-
shire and Slesnick, 1993, pp. 36-37). Still, this standard is certainly not univer-
sally applied. Forensic economists can and do testify in personal injury cases in 
many legal venues using discount rates based on the investment returns avail-
able on securities that carry 3efault risk, including municipal bonds, corporate 
bonds, annuities and corporate stocks. 2 
lIreland distinguishes between inflation "risk," which relates to the expected rate of inflation that 
is already embodied in the nominal interest rate, and inflation "uncertainty," which relates to the:. 
unexpected variance in the expected rate of inflation. (Ireland, 1997, pp. 24-25) Others have used' 
the term "inflation risk" to mean the same thing as Ireland's "inflation uncertainty." 
2A colleague of the author has testified on corporate stock returns in at least 10 different states. 
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It should also be noted that the Pfeifer opinion contains enough confusion 
that it seems unlikely to be the final word (see Breeden, 2002, p. 24). Judicial 
opinions can change in the face of persuasive economic arguments as well as 
changing economic circumstances, such as the increasing financial sophistica-
tion of the general public. For example, approximately half of all U.S. house-
holds now own mutual funds (Investment Company Institute, 2003, p. 41), and 
90% of these households hold equity funds that represent 65% of their mutual 
fund portfolios (Investment Company Institute, 2003, p. 44). With so much fi-
nancial information and advice now freely available in the mainstream news 
media and over the Internet, it might someday be concluded that investment in 
mutual funds does not necessarily require a high degree of "financial expertise 
or skill." 
It is often argued that there should be no connection between the determi-
nation of an appropriate discount rate and an appropriate investment alloca-
tion of a damage award. (See, for example, Romans and Floss, 1992; Ireland, 
1998) As Ireland has put it: 
No investment advisor would advise an award recipient to place 
a lump sum in a riskless investment of any sort .. .. A reasonable in-
vestment allocation for most workers would include a significant 
fraction of common stocks. The fact that the discount rate ... should 
be riskless does not imply that the award should be invested in a 
riskless fashion. (Ireland, 1998, p. 269) 
Clearly, one possible basis for this view would be the case law from Pfeifer 
and similar rulings. However, the economic basis for this view is that the ap-
propriate discount rate, rather than reflecting the prospective investment 
allocation of the award, should instead reflect the degree of risk associated 
with the future earnings stream that is to be discounted. This is discussed in 
detail in the following section. 
III. Economic Arguments 
Setting legal considerations aside, there has been an ongoing economic de-
bate about the use of a risk-free discount rate. Jennings and Phillips (1989) 
have discussed the risk associated with deviations of actual future labor in-
come from expected future labor income. To the extent that such deviations 
may occur, this would "call for the stream of expected labor earnings to be dis-
counted by a higher, risk-adjusted rate." (Jennings and Phillips 1989, p. 123) 
Their survey of the literature indicates that labor is not a risk-free asset, and 
that investment in human capftal is, in fact, subject to considerable risk. They 
quote other scholars to the effect that human capital is "probably more risky 
than physical capital."( Levhari and Weiss, 1974, p. 950) 
Phillips (1989) has categorized the risks associated with labor income into 
non-systematic and systematic risks. Non-systematic risks are inherent in the 
individual employee and individual employer, while systematic risks are in-
herent in the overall economy. Examples of non-systematic risk offered by 
Phillips include skill obsolescence in the face of advancing technology or for-
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eign competition, family emergencies, and even a possibility that a particular 
industry might exit from a region entirely. A further elaboration of non-sys-
tematic risk might include unanticipated health problems, changes in family 
structure due to childbirth, divorce, or the death of a spouse, and the relocation 
of offices, plants or production lines, all of which could adversely affect an indi-
vidual's earnings. The one example of systematic risk offered by Phillips is the 
possibility of cyclical unemployment, but to this could be added variations over 
time in economy-wide productivity growth. Phillips has argued that the risks of 
labor income call for a discount rate somewhere in-between a risk-free rate 
(short-term Treasuries) and the total return on a diversified stock portfolio 
(e.g., the S & P 500), and he suggests as a first approximation the use of the 
AAA corporate bond rate. (phillips, 1989, pp. 93-94) 
Of course, some of the risks of labor income often are accounted for by ad-
justing the future earnings stream itself, and when this is done it would be 
"double-counting" to also adjust the discount rate for these same risks. Thus, 
the "LPE" method adjusts the earnings stream downward for the probabilities 
of death, non-participation in the labor force, and unemployment to obtain the 
expected earnings stream. But even so, Margulis (1992) has applied generally 
accepted principles of finance to reach the s~me general conclusion as Jennings 
and Philltps. Margulis emphasizes that "parity in risk" should be maintained 
between projected earnings and the discount rate. Only actual future earnings 
are risk-free, and they are not knowable. Expected future earnings are not risk-
free. According to Margulis: 
To compute a lump-sum award for damages by discounting un-
certain, albeit expected, future losses to present value by a risk-free 
interest rate may yield an award which is excessive and which un-
justly enriches the plaintiff. The correct discount rate to apply is one 
which is risk-adjusted to counterbalance the forecast uncertainties 
associated with estimating future losses. (Margulis, 1992, p. 41) 
This position has been challenged by Albrecht (1993, 1997), who has at-
tempted to show, using simple algebra, that a risk-free rate should be used to 
discount expected earnings. Albrecht first assumes that the expected future 
loss has been calculated and is known. He then defmes the· problem as one of 
calculating a present amount such that the expected future value of this pre-
sent amount equals the expected future loss. He then proceeds to demonstrate 
that this result can be obtained only through use of a risk-free rate. 
Albrecht has been challenged, and Margulis supported, by Biederman and 
Baesemann (1996), who have argued that a risk-free discount rate should be. 
used only in two very specia1 cases: (1) when discounting certainty equivalents, 
or (2) when the decision-maker is indifferent to risk. A certainty equivalent 
could, in principle, be calculated as the expected future loss less an adjustment 
factor, ~ith the latter set at the level such that the certainty equivalent would 
yield the same level of utility as would be obtained from the uncertain but ex- .. 
pected income. If the future earnings stream being discounted does not consist 
of certainty equivalents, then the use of a risk-free discount rate would be jus-
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tified only if the decision maker is indifferent to risk, i.e., risk-neutral. (Bied-
erman and Baesemann, 1996, p. 46-47) 
Henderson and Seward (1998) have also entered the fray on the side of 
Margulis. Albrecht explicitly assumed risk-neutrality, and Henderson and 
Seward demonstrate quite clearly that Albrecht's results do not hold if indi-
viduals are risk-averse. Since risk-aversion is the normal state of affairs, use of 
a risk-free discount rate will typically result in overcompensation of the plain-
tiff. 
A similar, more recent discussion has occurred among Bell and Taub 
(1999), Ireland (1999) and Breeden (2002). Bell and Taub have taken Ireland to 
task for stating that, once the earnings stream has been adjusted for non-sur-
vival, non-participation in the labor force and unemployment, the use of a dis-
count rate that includes a premium for default risk is incorrect in that it in-
volves double counting of the risk that the worker would not earn the projected 
income. Bell and Taub have asserted that (1) there is no necessary equivalence 
between the risk of not earning the projected income and the risk of default on 
bonds, so reducing the projected earnings using the LPE method is not 
equivalent to raising the discount rate to incorporate the probability of default, 
(2) even if there were such equivalence, the LPE method does not cover all of 
the risks of the future earnings, e.g., variance in productivity growth, and (3) 
even if the LPE method did cover all of the risks of the future earnings, a risk-
free rate should be used only for certainty equivalents. 
In his response, Ireland has stated that his insistence on the use of a risk-
free discount rate was primarily based on legal rather than economic grounds. 
Any adjustments to be made for the risk of labor income should be made to the 
earnings stream, not the discount rate, in order to comply with the law. (Ire-
land, 1999) In any case, it does seem clear that the LPE method does not ad-
just for all of the risks of future earnings:-In addition to the uncertainty of fu-
ture productivity growth that has been highlighted by Bell and Taub, there are 
a number of non-systematic risks that are not accounted for with this method. 
Even if an individual does not die, drop out of the labor force or become unem-
ployed, he/she may experience an unanticipated reduction in earnings in the 
future for a variety of possible reasons. These might include developing health 
problems of the individual or family members, a change in family responsibili-
ties due to a change in the family structure, skill obsolescence due to advanc-
ing technology or foreign competition, and relocation decisions of the employer. 
While commenting on the dispute between Bell and Taub and Ireland, 
Breeden (2002) carries the discussion one step further by focusing on what he 
calls the "income-variance" risk factor. Two individuals might have identical 
expected future earnings streams, but the expected variance of the two earn-
ings streams could be quite different. He offers the example of two brothers, 
one a free-lance financial advisor with a widely-fluctuating income and· the 
other a university administrator with a much more stable income. He suggests 
that the two cases should not be treated the same, and that use of a risk-ad-
justed discount rate may be appropriate where the expected variance is high. 
While clearly there are differences of opinion, the literature just surveyed 
does convey considerable support, on economic grounds, for incorporating risk 
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into the discount rate due to the inherent riskiness of labor income. To date 
there has been little consideration of how risk might be incorporated into the 
discount rate or of what effect this might have in practice. The remainder of 
this paper seeks to fill this empirical void by showing the effect of basing the 
discount rate, in whole or in part, on returns available on "risky" investments 
of varying degrees of risk. 
IV. Method and Data 
Published surveys of forensic economics practice as well as an examination 
of the forensic economics literature indicate that the most common method 
used by forensic economists to estimate the present value of a future earnings 
loss involves the use of long-term historical averages of discount rates and 
earnings growth rates (see Brookshire and Slesnick, 1993, 1999). These aver-
age discount rates and earnings growth rates are used, either separately or 
after first being combined into a net discount rate, to calculate the present 
value of the future losses. ' 
In this paper, this historical averages method is employed to generate net 
discount rates based on historical periods of various lengths (30, 20, 10 years) 
and based on the investment returns on securities of various degrees of risk 
(Treasury bills, intermediate-term government securities, long-term corporate 
bonds, large company stocks, a mixed portfolio). These net discount rates are 
then used to estimate the present value of a future earnings loss for future pe-
riods of 30, 20 and 10 years, respectively. The net discount rate is defined as 
" [(1 + R)/(1 + G)] - 1 
where R is the average compound annual rate of return on investments over 
the historical period and G is the average compound annual compensation 
growth rate over the· same historical period. In calculating the present value 
awards, it is assumed that investment returns are received and wages paid out 
at the end of each year and that the initial annual loss is $1,000, as measured 
in the year just prior to the first year of the future loss period. 
The investment return data used in this study are the annual returns on 
Treasury bills, intermediate-term government bonds (constant five-year ma-
turity), long-term (high-grade) corporate bonds and large company stocks cov- \ 
ering the period 1972-2001 from Ibbotson's. (Ibbotson Associates, 2002) These. 
returns are the total returns, including capital gains and losses as well as in-
terest and dividends. Each of these four investment vehicles is considered 
separately and, in addition, a mixed portfolio is utilized consisting of 50% large 
company stocks, 30% intermediate-term government bonds, and 20% Treasury 
bills. This portfolio obviously represents just one of an infinite number of at.·. 
ternative asset allocations that might be considered. However, it was chosen to 
incorporate a significant component of "risky" securities while still represent· 
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ing a relatively conservative portfolio for a long-term investor with a moderate 
tolerance for risk. 3 
The labor earnings series used in this study to calculate earnings growth 
rates is the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics index of compensation per hour in 
the U.S. non-farm business sector. (See Jacobs, 2001 and Economic Report of 
the President, 2003.) Given the increasing importance of fringe benefits in the 
post-World War II period, a labor earnings series that includes fringe benefits 
seems clearly preferable to a wage-only series for calculating net discount 
rates.4 
V. Risk, Net Discount Rates and Present Values 
. The main results of this study are summarized in Tables 1 and 2, each of 
which is comprised of three parts. Table I-a shows, for the 30-year historical 
period, 1972-2001, the average compound annual rates of return on the various 
investments,5 the average compound annual rate of growth in employee 
compensation,6 and the corresponding net discount rates. These net discount 
rates are used to compute the present values shown for 30-year, 20-year and 
10-year future loss periods. The net discount rates range from 0.73% when the 
"risk-free" Treasury bills are used to 6.01% when the riskiest alternative, large 
company stocks, are used. Of course, such a wide range of net discount rates 
produces a wide range of present values. In the case of the 30-year future loss, 
for example, the present value ranges from $26,855 with Treasury bills to just 
$13,750 with large company stocks. 
Table 1-b shows the net discount rates and present values when the 20-
year historical period, 1982-2001, is used to derive the net discount rates. Over 
this period. the average return on Treasury bills was actually lower than for 
the 30-year historical period, although the average returns on government 
bonds, corporate bonds. and stocks were significantly higher. When these vari-
ous returns are coupled with the lower average compensation growth rate 
(4.35% vs. 5.88% ), we find the net discount rates were markedly higher across 
the board, but much less so for Treasury bills compared to the other invest-
ments. As a result, in comparison to the case with the 30-year historical period, 
the present values derived from use of the various alternative investments are 
all much lower relative to the Treasury bill present values. 
Table 1-c displays the outcomes when the 10-year historical period, 1992-
2001, is used for the historical averages underlying the net discount rates. 
BLinke (1997, p. 248) recently reported data showing that corporate defined benefit pension plans 
held 56% of their assets in equities. A similar allocation is often recommended to individuals of 
moderate risk tolerance who are approaching retirement. 
4Fringe benefits were minimal prior to World War II, but began to grow rapidly during the war and 
thereafter, so they now constitute a significant fraction of total employee compensation. See Kauf-
man and Hotchkiss, 2003, pp. 408-409. 
5The compound average annual returns for the 30-yearhistorical period reported in Table 1 were 
calculated from the annual return data in Ibbotson Associates, 2002, Table 2-5. The returns for the 
10-year and 20-year historical periods are from Tables 2-9 and 2-11, respectively. 
&The compound average annual growth rates in compensation for the various historical periods 
reported in Table 1 were calculated from the data in Jacobs, 2001 and Economic Report of the 
President, 2003. 
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During this period, the average compensation growth rate was lower than for 
the 20-year historical period (3.98% compared to 4.35%), but average returns 
























Historical Net Discount Rates and Present Values 
(Base Loss:::: $1,000) 
I-a. Historical Period: 1972·2001 
Length of Future Loss Period 
1972-2001 30 Years 20 Years 10 Years 
Ave. Compo Net Present Present Present 
Return* Growth** Discount Value Value Value 
6.65 5.88 0.73 $26,855 $18,546 $9,610 
8.50 5.88 2.47 $21,014 $15,633 $8,766 
8.99 5.88 2.94 $19,753 $14,960 $8,556 
12.24 5.88 6.01 $13,750 $11,461 $7,357 
10.00 5.88 3.89 $17,525 $13,724 $8,155 
I-b. Historical Period: 1982-2001 
Length of Future Loss Period 
1982-2001 30 Years 20 Years 10 Years 
Ave. Compo Net Present Present Present 
Return* Growth** Discount Value Value Value 
6.09 4.35 1.67 $23,447 $16,884 $9,140 
9.88 4.35 5.30 $14,860 $12,151 $7,610 
12.12 4.35 7.45 $11,868 $10,233 $6,880 
15.24 4.35 10.44 $9,092 $8,264 $6,030 
11.80 4.35 7.14 $12,237 $10,480 $6,978 
I-c. Historical Period: 1992-2001 
Length of Future Loss Period 
1992-2001 30 Years 20 Years 10 Years 
Ave. Compo Net Present Present Present 
Return* Growth** Discount Value Value Value 
4.56 3.98 0.56 $27,545 $18,871 $9,699 
6.73 3.98 2.64 $20,545 $15,385 $8,689 
8.09 3.98 3.95 $17,397 $13,651 $8,131 
12.93 3.98 8.61 $10,640 $9,388 $6,529 
9.40 3.98 5.21 $15,011 $12,243 $7,644 
*Based on data from Ibbotson Associates (2002). 
**Based on data from Economic Report of the President (2003) and Jacobs (2001). 
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Table 2 
Potential Overcompensation from Using Risk-Free Discount Rate 
2-a. Basis for Discounting: Government Bonds 
Historical Period Lenl! h of Future Loss Period 
Used For Discountinl! 30 Years 20 Years 10 Years 
1972-2001 28% 19% 10% 
1982-2001 58% 39% 20% 
1992-2001 34% 23% 12% 
2-b. Basis for Discountinl!: Coroorate Borids 
Historical Period Lenl! h of Future Loss Period 
Used For Discounting 30 Years 20 Years 10 Years 
1972-2001 36% 24% 12% 
1982-2001 97% 65% 33% 
1992-2001 58% 38% 19% 
2-c. Basis for Discountinl!: Portfolio 
Historical Period Leng h of Future Loss Period 
Used For Discountinl! 30 Years 20 Years 10 Years 
1972-2001 53% 35% 18% 
1982-2001 92% 61% 31% 
1992-2001 83% 54% 27% 
Before proceeding, another aspect of the data shown in Table 1 should be 
noted. Given the length of the future loss period, and given the investment ve-
hicle, the estimated present value of the future loss varies considerably de-
pending on the length of the historical period used as the basis for discounting. 
This suggests that any forensic economist who uses the historical averages 
method should select the historical period very carefully. 7 
VI. Potential Overcompensation 
The data in Table 1 illustrate just how much difference it makes when a 
net discount rate based on a risk-free security (Treasury bills) is used instead 
of one of the risky alternatives. If use of a risk-adjusted discount rate is consid-
ered appropriate, then discounting with Treasury bills will result in overcom-
pensation of the plaintiff. The present value figures in Table 1 have been used 
to derive the figures relating to potential overcompensation that appear in Ta-
ble 2. 
Suppose first that, based on legal considerations, it is considered inappro-
priate to expose the lump sum recipient to default risk but appropriate to ex-
pose him to moderate inflation risk. It might then be reasonable to base the 
discount rate on the returns on intermediate-term government bonds. Table 2-
a illustrates the potential overcompensation from basing the discount rate on 
Treasury bills instead. For a 30-year future loss, we would over-compensate 
70thers have found problems with the accuracy of the historical averages method. For two of the 
best studies, see Schilling (1985) and Haydon and Webb (1992). 
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the plaintiff by 28% if we use the 30-year historical averages to derive the net 
discount rate. The extent of overcompensation would be 58% if we use the 20-
year historical averages, and 34% if we use the lO-year historical averages. For 
a 20-year future loss, the use of Treasury bills instead of intermediate-term 
government bonds would result in overcompensation ranging from 19% using 
the 30-year historical period to 39% using the 20-year historical period. For a 
lO-year future loss, the overcompensation would range from 10% to 20%. 
Suppose next that it is considered appropriate, based on economic grounds, 
for the lump sum recipient to be exposed to a relatively low level of default risk 
as well as some inflation risk. The returns on high-grade corporate bonds 
might then be a reasonable basis for the net discount rate. (The default risk 
could be minimized through investment in an appropriate mutual fund.) Under 
these circumstances, if Treasury bills are used instead of corporate bonds as 
the basis for discounting, the extent of overcompensation will generally be even 
greater than in the previous case, as illustrated in Table 2-b. For a 30-year fu-
ture loss it would range from 36% to as high as 97% , depending on the histori-
cal period used to derive the net discount rate. For a 20-year future loss, the 
overcompensation would range from 24% to 65%, and for a 10-year future loss, 
the overcompensation would range from 12% to 33% . I 
Finally, suppose that the appropriate level of risk for discounting purposes 
can be represented by the portfolio described earlier, consisting of 50% large 
company stocks, 30% intermediate government bonds and 20% Treasury bills, 
Table 2-c shows the potential overcompensation if Treasury bills are used in-
stead of the portfolio as the basis for discounting. For a 30-year future loss the 
overcompensation would range from 53% to 92% depending on the historical . 
period used to derive the net discount rate; for a 20-year future loss the over-. 
compensation would range from 35% to 61%; for a 10-year future loss the over-
compensation would range from 18% to 31%. . 
Other things being equal, the use of a risk-free discount rate· maximizes 
the present value. If the use of a risk-free discount rate is inappropriate, then 
its use would result in overcompensation for the plaintiff. As these results 
show, the potential overcompensation in many cases could be very substantial. 
VII. Concluding Comments 
Where the use of a risk-free discount rate is clearly mandated by law, fo-
rensic economists must use a risk-free discount rate. This makes the determi-., • 
nation of the appropriate discount rate a somewhat easier task. But forensiQ. 
economists are retained as economic, not legal, experts, and should not pre;" 
sume anything about the law. And where the use of a risk-free discount rate is I' 
not clearly mandated by law, it is the responsibility of the economic expert to 
apply hislher expertise to a more thorough analysis of the appropriate discount. 
rate. This would include consideration of the economic arguments for incorpo": 
rating risk. By considering how returns on alternative investments of varying 
degrees of risk differ from the returns on Treasury bills, this paper has demon-
strated that incorporating risk in a reasonable way into the discount rate can 
make a significant difference in the estimate of the present value of a lost fu~ 
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ture earnings stream. The results indicate that, under many circumstances, 
the failure to incorporate risk will result in substantial overcompensation for 
the plaintiff. 
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